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 AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF BOUNDED 
RATIONALITY: APPLYING INSIGHTS FROM 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS TO INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
Franziska Brecht, Oliver Günther, Werner Güth, Ksenia Koroleva 
Abstract 
The paradigm of bounded rationality considers the limited ability of individuals to make consistent 
and rational choices. Due to the scarcity of research on this phenomenon in information systems, we 
conducted an experimental study investigating decision-making regarding risk preferences and social 
preferences. Moreover, we explored the stability of these preferences under different conditions and 
uncovered the role of information retrieval in individual decision-making. We find that although 
individuals are generally risk-averse and egoistic, none of these preferences is stable under the 
conditions tested which provides indices of boundedly rational decision-making. Although the 
information retrieved by participants generally allows to infer their preferences, the increasing 
amount and complexity of this information again often results in boundedly rational behavior. 
Keywords: bounded rationality, experimental design, information retrieval, stability of attitudes and 
behavior, cognitive tracing, behavioral economics, behavioral information systems. 
JEL classification: C18, C91, D03, D81 
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Research in information systems (IS) involves two complementary paradigms, design science and 
behavioral science. Design science seeks to generate and validate IT artefacts, whereas behavioral 
science seeks to explain human behavior in an IS environment (Hevner et al., 2004). IS is therefore an 
interdisciplinary science in which researchers employ a variety of methodologies and theories from 
other disciplines. One of the most important theories in behavioral IS, the Technology Acceptance 
Model (TAM; Davis, 1989), is based on a theory from social psychology, the theory of reasoned 
action (TRA; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). Researchers seeking to explore TAM usually use survey 
instruments and thus can only measure the ‘stated’ behavior. ‘Actual’ behavior can only be measured 
in experiments, which require much more resources to conduct. However, empirical evidence shows 
that individuals do not always act in accordance with their stated preferences or behavior (e.g. Berendt 
et al., 2005). This gap can be explained by internal factors, such as characteristics of the individual, 
cognitive biases and psychological distortions, as well as external – limited time, monetary or 
cognitive resources. The internal factors are being extensively explored in behavioral economics under 
the paradigm of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957). Bounded rationality can be well applied to study 
the gap between stated vs. actual behavior with regards to IT adoption as well and therefore in this 
paper aim to apply the lessons learned from behavioral science to IS. 
Our experimental study seeks to identify boundedly rational aspects in individual decision-making by 
testing the stability of individual preferences with regard to risk and altruism. In order to identify 
preferences, we first employ the revealed-preference  approach (Samuelson, 1983), a traditional 
approach in empirical economics, which allows to infer motives from observable behavior, i.e. real 
choices as opposed to surveys or the measurement of psychological reactions. Therefore, instead of 
asking participants about their preferences directly, in an experimental setting our participants are 
required to make decisions in scenarios that involve risk and concern other individuals. In particular, 
the participants state their willingness to pay for a prospect (a monetary promise) that can be combined 
with different characteristics. By analysing the prices individuals state, we are able to infer their real 
risk preferences and social preferences. Further, the stability of these preferences is tested in an 
experimental design which involves several treatments. Specifically, we change the order in which 
individuals have to make their decisions, or require participants to either buy or sell the prospects of 
the same monetary value. If individuals were rational, the conditions would not have an impact on the 
decisions individuals make. Deviations from the decisions, would, however, indicate the boundedly 
rational aspects in their behavior. The set-up of our study is rather theoretical, but it allows for 
generalizability and application of our findings to a wide variety of contexts, for example to study 
privacy-related attitudes in IS (see e.g. Grossklags and Aquisti, 2007; Berendt et al., 2005). 
In our experiment we not only explore the actual decisions that individuals make, but also the process 
in which the decisions are taken. For that, we do not provide the participants with information about 
the possible payoffs of their prospects, but require them to purchase this information for a minor fee. 
In order to achieve this, we use cognition tracing to interpret this data in connection with the decisions 
individuals make. On the one hand, by analysing what information individuals purchase for which 
decision, we can deduce individual preferences for risk and altruism. On the other hand, information 
retrieval behavior can provide insights into boundedly rational decision-making. Would individuals 
invest in purchasing information at all? Would they direct their cognitive resources to process it? 
Although initially the increases in the amount of information have been found to have a positive 
impact, after a certain point the additional information has a detrimental impact on the reasoning of 
individuals (Schneider et al., 1987). In e-commerce, authors repeatedly find evidence for diminishing 
decision quality when consumers are faced with superfluous information (e.g. Chen et al., 2009). Due 
to limited cognitive resources, individuals might refrain from purchasing and processing information, 
base their decision on an limited amount of available information (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 1999) 
and forego their stated preferences as a result.  
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-  Can we deduce risk and social preferences from actual behavior?  
-  How stable are these preferences under different conditions? 
To address our research questions, we first present related literature and develop hypotheses. Then we 
extensively describe the set-up of our experiment. The results section follows which not only covers 
the general overview, but answers specific research questions mentioned above. Subsequently, we 
discuss these results and conclude with a summary of our findings. 
2  Related literature and hypotheses 
Rationality, as seen from a neoclassical perspective, aims at maximizing monetary gains. However, 
uncertainty, incomplete information, limited time for decision-making and the inability to process 
information are the reasons why individuals’ behavior is merely boundedly rational (Simon, 1957). 
The knowledge on boundedly rational economic behavior is, however, still very limited (Selten, 
1998). Only single aspects of such behavior have been investigated empirically, among them risk 
preferences such as the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961), social preferences such as altruism (e.g. 
Brennan, 1975), or the non-stability of preferences in general when deciding under different 
circumstances (e.g. Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1995). Researchers in IS, predominantly in the area of 
privacy research, have been trying to use boundedly rational aspects in order to explain human 
behavior: Acquisti and Grossklags (2004) explain the dichotomy between privacy attitudes and 
behavior by certain psychological distortions, e.g. optimism bias or self-control problems, such as the 
preference for immediate gratification. The authors show that even if individuals want to genuinely 
protect themselves, psychological distortions induce them to trade-off privacy for small rewards or 
convenience benefits (Acquisti and Grossklags, 2004). In an online shop experiment, Berendt et al. 
(2005) find that individuals forget about their privacy concerns which they stated before the 
experiment and reveal very personal details without any reason to do so (Berendt et al., 2005).  
In our study we investigate the classical scenario in behavioral economics - preferences of individuals 
when they make decisions that involve risk and the welfare of other individuals. Güth et al. (2008) 
find that individuals are generally risk-averse. As to the social preferences, experiments show that 
more than 50% of participants voluntarily share money with other participants (Camerer, 2003) and 
individuals are on average altruistic (Güth et al., 2008). Several models within the framework of 
rational choice theory try to explain such pro-social behavior, by e.g. inequality aversion (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999), altruism (Andreoni and Miller, 2002), and Rawlsian ‘social welfare’ preferences 
(Charness and Rabin, 2003). Therefore, in a scenario where a decision maker is being forced to put the 
prospect of another individual on the market, we expect that the decision maker is more likely to 
protect the prospect of the passive partner, even if she/he could benefit from selling it. Vice versa, 
when provided with the opportunity to buy prospects for another individual, we expect a considerable 
investment from the decision maker. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
H1: Individuals price prospects with a risky payoff lower than prospects with a fixed payoff. 
H2: Individuals refrain from the maximum benefit in support of the prospect of another individual.  
The stability of preferences with regard to different domains or situations has been subject of other 
studies as well. For example, Weber et al. (2002) compare risk preferences across e.g. financial and 
social decisions and find that risk preferences are highly domain specific, i.e. individuals are not 
consistently risk-averse or risk-seeking across all domains. One of the most prominent is the so-called 
endowment effect, i.e. the tendency of individuals to value goods more once their property right has 
been established (Kahneman et al., 1990). The endowment effect is reinforced by loss aversion, 
referring to the individual preference of avoiding losses as opposed to acquiring gains (Kahneman et 
al., 1990). In our experiment we want to explore if individuals state the same reservation prices if they 
are allowed to sell the prospects or to acquire them. We hypothesize that:  
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Moreover, authors show that decisions often depend on the sequence (or order) in which they are 
made. In experiments, an order bias (see Perreault, 1975) is usually anticipated due to demand effects 
and learning effects. The former occur when participants form an interpretation of the experiment's 
purpose and unconsciously change their behavior accordingly (Rosenthal and Rosnow, 2009), whereas 
the latter refer to benefits of increased experience in decision-making as participants proceed along the 
stages of the experiment. We assume that in general the appraisal of prospects decreases as the 
sequence of decisions concerning these prospects proceeds. Therefore we hypothesize that:  
H4: Individuals price prospects higher when they price them first, compared to a scenario in which 
they price these prospects second.  
Finally, we want to investigate the role of information retrieval in the decision process. To the best of 
our knowledge, no study so far has explored the information retrieval behavior with respect to 
appraisal of prospects that involve risk and welfare of others. We assume that the degree to which 
decision makers purchase information and the type of information that is chosen, can be used to imply 
the corresponding preferences of the decision makers. We expect two concepts, ambiguity aversion 
and loss aversion to influence the information retrieval behavior of individuals. On the one hand 
ambiguity aversion might motivate participants to purchase information in order to know the expected 
payoff of their prospect. Ambiguity aversion describes a preference for known risks over unknown 
risks (Camerer and Weber, 1992) and is demonstrated in the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961). The 
paradox states that individuals prefer lower payoffs when they know the probability of the outcome 
compared to higher payoffs with unknown probabilities. On the other hand, loss-aversion may induce 
the decision makers to refrain from purchasing information to avoid sure losses. Additionally, by the 
type of information participants purchase, we might be able to infer risk and social preferences. For 
this, we used the mouse lab technique, which allows to measure which information participants 
purchase and correlated it with thinking steps (Huck, 2004, p. 133), thus revealing participants’ 
preferences. 
3 Experimental  protocol 
We simulated a software-based virtual marketing platform on which the purchase price is determined 
by a computerized, random draw. The only available commodity are prospects that promise a 
monetary payoff. Each of the prospects could either yield a ‘fixed’ payoff or a ‘risky’ payoff. 
Specifically, a risky prospect either yields a high payoff with probability p or a low payoff with 
probability (1-p). Participants had to specify a price at which they were willing to buy respectively sell 
a prospect (reservation price). The additional information about the values of the payoff of the 
prospects was available to participants at a fixed price. For every prospect, the payoff took the form of 
a payment in an experimental currency unit (ECU). 
Participants had to decide about the prospects that pay off for them (decision maker’s prospect, DM) 
or that pay off for an unknown passive partner (PP). As far as the prospects for the PP are concerned, 
the experiment represented a dictator game. Such games are characterized by the power of one 
decision maker (DM) to determine unilaterally which share of a certain commodity a PP (PP) will 
receive (Güth et al., 1982). In our experiment, interaction between the decision makers, i.e the 
participants and their PPs was impossible. Therefore, each participant had to state four reservation 
prices in the two phases of the experiment: two for own and two for other’s prospects (within-subject 
design). 
In order to test the stability of preferences, we introduced different treatments. In order to account for 
a possible endowment effect, participants had either to state their willingness to pay (WTP) in order to 
buy a prospect or their willingness to accept (WTA) in order to sell a prospect. Further, in order to 
account for a possible order effect, participants either first stated reservation prices for their own 
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overview of the treatments (between-subject design) is presented in Table	1. 
In our experiment participants had to decide whether they want to purchase information, which kind of 
information and how to use this information in order to state their reservation price. A list of pieces of 
information was provided by means of a mouse lab (Figure 1). In order to retrieve a piece of 
information, participants first clicked on it to purchase it and could then click on it again to see the 
information. Additionally, when purchasing some pieces of information, participants had to process 
them before using them for decision-making. Specifically, the information about the payoff of the 
risky prospect could either be purchased as single information (amount of high and low payoff and the 
respective probabilities) or as aggregated information in form of the expected value during each phase.  
	
Time order of phases  WTP  WTA 
DM’s prospects 
PP’s prospects  ‘DM first’     
PP’s prospects 




In the end of the experiment, the stated reservation prices were compared with computer-generated 
selling (buying) prices, based on the incentive-compatible random price mechanism (Becker et al. 
1964). For each participant, the comparison of the stated with the generated prices revealed whether 
she/he bought prospects (WTP) respectively sold her/his prospects (WTA). The higher the reservation 
prices, the higher was the probability to sell (WTA) or to buy (WTP) a specific prospect. The price 
comparison took place at the end of the experiment, in order to reduce learning effects.  
4 Results 
4.1 General  results 
An overview of the means and standard deviations for the reservation prices that participants stated for 
all prospects, is presented separately for each treatment group in Table 2. We find that participants bid 
more for their own prospects in the WTA than in the WTP treatment group providing indices of the 
endowment effect. They bid almost always more in the order treatment group ‘DM first’ than in the 
order treatment group ‘PP first’ for DM’s prospects indicating an order effect. Further, participants bid 
much less for the PP’s prospects than for their own prospects, revealing a rather egoistic behavior. 
Note that only when stating reservation prices larger than 1 ECU participants could possibly – 
depending on the random price – not sell the prospect of the PP (WTA) or buy a prospect for the PP 
(WTP). Therefore, the larger the reservation prices for the PP’s prospect, the more altruistic the 
participant is. We notice that participants were stating higher reservation prices for the PP’s prospects 
in order treatment ‘PP first’ as opposed to ‘DM first’.  
 
Mean (Standard Deviation) of 
reservation prices 
DM’s prospects  PP’s prospects 
fixed  risky  fixed  risky 
WTA  ‘DM first’  8.33 (1.58)  10.41 (2.39)  3.02 (3.63)  3.43 (4.21) 
‘PP first’  7.85 (3.25)  9.27 (3.76)  4.48 (4.20)  5.13 (4.35) 
WTP  ‘DM first’  6.33 (1.80)  8.96 (3.24)  2.48 (2.61)  3.56 (3.90) 
‘PP first’  6.61 (3.28)  8.03 (3.68)  4.86 (4.24)  4.79 (4.79) 
Value of the prospect  7.5  10  7  9.5 
Table 2.   Overview of reservation prices for all prospects. 
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regression of reservation prices for all participants over all treatments. Due to the within-subject 
design we apply a panel data regression, as each participant stated eight reservation prices (four 
reservation prices for DM’s prospects and four for PP’s prospects). In order to incentivize participants 
to purchase information in every phase we had to vary the payoffs across prospects. Therefore, we 
normalized the dependent variable: for reservation prices appraising risky prospect we subtracted the 
expected value of the risky prospect, whereas for the fixed prospects we subtracted the fixed payoff. 
The independent variables account for the different prospect characteristics: risk, person, as well as the 
treatment variables: order (‘DM first’ vs. ‘PP first’) and treatment (WTP vs. WTA). In order to 
account for the combined impact of the variables, we include the interaction effect of order and 
person. All other interaction effects do not make sense theoretically. 
 
Variable / Treatment  Coefficient (Standard Error)  
Risk (0 - no risk, 1 - risk)  -1.27*** (0111) 
Person (0 - DM, 1 - PP)  -4.72*** (0.157) 
Order Treatment (0 - ‘DM first’, 1 - ‘PP first’)   -0.85*** (0.259) 
WTA/WTP Treatment (0 - WTA, 1 - WTP)  -1.56*** (0.235) 
Order*person 2.54***  (0.224) 
Intercept 0.93***  (0.224) 
R-squared   0.257  
N  2928 
Table 3.   Regression for prospects, normalized reservation prices (*** - 1% significance). 
The results presented in Table 3 reveal that all main variables (Risk, Person, Order, WTA/WTP, 
Order) are significant at 1% level. More specifically, we find that participants are generally risk-
averse, i.e. they state lower reservation prices for risky prospects in comparison to fixed ones. Further, 
the reservation prices are much higher for DM’s prospects compared to PP’s prospects. The 
coefficient for the variable ‘person’ is the highest, which indicates that this variable has the highest 
influence on reservation prices. We confirm the significance of the endowment effect: the participants 
state higher reservation prices in order to sell prospects than to buy them. Further, we also confirm an 
order effect: our participants state on average higher reservation prices when they state reservation 
prices first for themselves (the DM) compared to when they state reservation prices first for the PP (cf. 
section ‘Stability of preferences’). Although participants bid less for the PP’s prospect than for their 
own prospect, and less in the order treatment PP first than DM first, when order*person are interacted 
we observe a softening effect: participants bid more for the PP’s prospect when they consider these 
prospects first. 
4.2  Risk preferences and social preferences 
Following the revealed preference approach, from the normalized reservation prices (see Table 2 for 
an overview) we deduced the participants risk and social preferences. Based on the mechanism 
proposed by Rabin (1993), we were able to categorize the participants according to their social and 
risk preferences. For social preferences, for each participant we calculated the mean of the two stated 
reservation prices for the fixed and risky PP’s prospects. We then performed a median split of the 
stated means across all participants (median = 3 ECU). Participants bidding on average more than 3 
ECU in favor of the PP were categorized as altruistic. Participants bidding 3 ECU or less were 
categorized as egoistic. Inferring risk preferences was done in a similar way. For each participant, we 
calculated the difference between the reservation prices for the risky prospect and the fixed DM’s 
prospect. We then determined the median of all means which was equal to 0.5 ECU. Participants 
above this threshold were categorized as risk-tolerant; participants whose mean was equal or smaller 
than 0.5 ECU were categorized as risk-averse. 
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In order to investigate the stability of preferences, we seek to extensively explore the already identified 
in the regression analysis the endowment and order effects. We already confirm a demand effect and 
an order effect by means of the regression in Table 3. In order to get deeper insights, we compared the 
prices stated in each of the treatments by conducting a Mann-Whitney U test for independent samples 
as the reservation prices are not normally distributed (Table 4). 
Based on the results presented in Table 4, we can see that the endowment effect exists only for the 
reservation prices of DM’s prospects, but not for the reservation prices of PP’s prospects. Further, the 
endowment effect for the DM’s prospects is independent of the order in which the prospects where 
stated (order treatment ‘DM first’ and ‘PP first’). Further, we confirm the existence of an order effect 
for almost all prospects in both WTA and WTP treatments (Table 4), except for fixed DM’s prospect 
and risky PP’s prospect in the WTP treatment. This means that participants state higher reservation 
prices for their own prospects in the order group ‘DM’ first compared to the participants in the order 
group ‘PP first’. Correspondingly, participants state lower reservation prices for the PP’s prospects in 
the order treatment group ‘DM first’ compared to participants in the order treatment group ‘PP first’ 




Differences     DM’s prospects  PP’s prospects 
fixed risky  fixed  risky 
Endowment 
effect 
WTA vs. WTP (‘DM first’)  2.00***  1.45***  0.54  -0.13 
WTA vs. WTP (‘PP first’)  1.24***  1.24***  0.38  0.34 
Order effect  ‘DM first’ vs.‘PP first’ (WTA)  0.051*  0.041**  0.060*  0.029** 
‘DM first’ vs.‘PP first’ (WTP)  0.761  0.078*  0.000***  0.143 
Table 4.   Endowment and order effects for the reservation prices. 
4.4 Information  retrieval 
In order to explore the process by which participants made their decisions, in this section we analyse 
their information retrieval behavior. Figure 2 gives an overview of the information that the participants 
purchased for their own as well as the prospects of the PP. We observe that almost all participants 
acquired information about their own fixed payoff, whereas different information about the payoff of 
the risky prospect was acquired by not more than 60% of the participants. This already indicated that 
participants were cognitively overloaded by the amount of information they could purchase. 
Moreover, more participants purchased information about the high payoff and high probability than 
about the low payoff and probability. Although participants purchased much less information about 
the payoff of the PP’s prospects than about their own prospects, the pattern of information purchase is 
similar.  
 
Figure 2.   Information retrieved for DM’s prospects and PP’s prospects. 
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made, we conduct a Mann-Whitney U test of independent samples on the reservation prices stated by 
participants who purchased a specific type of information as compared to those who did not. The 
results presented in Table 5 reveal that participants who bought the information about the fixed payoff 
bid significantly less for the fixed prospect than other participants.  
Concerning the risky prospect, we want to explore whether participants who possessed ‘full 
information’ for their decision about a risky prospect made better-informed decisions than other 
participants. Specifically, a ‘fully informed’ participant with regard to the risky prospect either 
requires the expected value or the high payoff, the low payoff and one of the probabilities. Although 
judging by the results presented in Table 5 full information does not influence the reservation prices, 
an impact of single pieces of information on the reservation price can be observed. Specifically, 
participants who purchase at least the high payoff or the probability for the high payoff state 
significantly higher reservation prices than those who have not bought these pieces of information. At 
the same time, individuals who bought the information about low payoff for the risky prospect bid 
significantly less than others. 
 
DM’s prospect  fixed   risky 
Information acquired  Fixed 
payoff 







Retrieved  Mean / St. Dev.  7.24 / 2.52  9.5 / 2.87  10.1 / 3.05  8.4 / 3.34  10 / 3.14  8.8 / 3.86 
N    325  223  189 125 180 40 
Not 
retrieved  
Mean / St. Dev.  7.8 / 4.00  9.1 / 4.15  8.5 / 3.62  9.8 / 3.39  8.7 / 3.57  9.4 / 3.37 
N    41  143  177 241 186 326 
Significance 0.018**  0.784  0.00***  0.00***  0.001***  0.237 
Table 5. Reservation prices for DM’s prospects of the ‘retrieved info’ vs. ‘not retrieved info’ groups. 
In order to deduce risk preferences from information retrieval behavior, we split the participants into 
groups by means of the median split procedure described above into risk-averse and risk-tolerant ones. 
With the help of Kendall’s correlation coefficient we check whether there is a correlation between the 
type of information participants retrieved and their revealed preferences. Concerning the correlation 
between risk preferences and information retrieval, in Table 6 we see that participants who do not 
purchase any information are rather risk-averse. Moreover, participants who purchase at least the 
information about the high payoff or the probability of the high payoff are risk-tolerant. Accordingly, 
participants who purchase at least the information about the low payoff are risk-averse. However, 
there is no significant correlation between the purchase of the probability for the low payoff and risk 
preferences. Further, participants who purchase the expected value turn out to be rather risk-tolerant. 
Interestingly, those who are ‘fully-informed’ are evenly divided between those who are risk-tolerant 
and those who are risk-averse and therefore, no significant correlation can be observed. 
 
Information acquired about DM’s risky 
prospect (number of participants) 
Risk Preferences  Kendall’s Correlation 
Risk-Tolerant (0)  Risk-Averse (1) 
high payoff info (189)   116  73  -0.218*** 
low payoff info (125)   52  73  0.133*** 
high probability (180)  110  70  -0.203*** 
low probability (40)  18  22  0.041 
Expected Value (114)   77  37  -0.225*** 
Full: high + low + probability (111)  54  57  0.029 
No information at all (30)  3  27  0.244*** 
Table 6.  Correlation between information retrieval for DM’s prospects and risk preferences. 
Moreover, we investigate if participants who purchased information about the PP’s prospects state 
significantly different reservation prices than those who did not. For fixed prospects this information 
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being ‘fully informed' about the risky prospect of the PP as well as the effect of purchasing at least one 
piece of information (i.e. high or low payoff, or high or low probability of the PP’s prospect) on the 
reservation prices. The results of an independent samples Mann-Whitney U test in Table 7 reveal that 
participants who retrieved any type of information about the PP’s payoffs generally state significantly 
higher reservation prices than participants who did not retrieve that information. 
 
PP’s Prospect  Fixed prospect  Risky Prospect 
Information acquired  fixed Payoff  Full  At least one 
Retrieved  Mean / St. Dev.  5.23 / 3.36  6.12 / 3.48  6.69 / 4.02 
N   185  102  172 
Not retrieved  Mean / St. Dev.  2.27 / 3.72  3.57 / 4.46  2.13 / 3.44 
N 181  264  194 
Significance 0.00***  0.00***  0.00*** 
Table 7.  Reservation prices for PP’s prospects of the ‘retrieved info’ vs. ‘not retrieved’ groups. 
In order to deduce social preferences from information retrieval behavior regarding the prospects of 
the PP, we split the participants into altruistic vs. egoistic ones by means of the median split procedure 
described above. Concerning the correlation between social preferences and information retrieval, 
judging by Table 8 we find that participants who are purchasing any type of information about the 
payoffs of the prospects of the PP are rather altruistic. Inversely, participants who did not purchase any 
information at all about the payoff of the PP are rather egoistic. 
 
Information acquired about PP’s prospects 
(number of participants) 
Social Preferences  Kendall’s Correlation 
Egoistic (0)  Altruistic (1) 
Payoff of the fixed prospect (185)   51  134  0.493*** 
Any info about payoff of risky prospect (172)  37  135  0.573*** 
No information at all (146)  127  19  -0.572*** 
Table 8.  Correlation between information retrieval for PP’s prospects and social preferences.  
5 Discussion 
The overview of our hypotheses is presented in Table 9. Regarding risk preferences, we find that 
participants bid less if the prospects are risky (H1). In general, measuring risk preferences based on 
reservation prices for risky prospects is effective. With regard to social preferences (H2), we find that 
most participants behave rather egoistically when they had to bid for prospects that pay off for the PP 
(cf. Table 2 and Table 3), which contradicts the findings of Güth et al. (2008). However, measuring 
altruism by means of reservation prices is ambiguous: we categorize all participants as altruistic who 
bid more than 3 ECU (median of all participants) for the PP’s prospect. When bidding 3 ECU, the 
probability that a participant will buy (WTP) or not sell (WTA) the PP’s prospect is low, as the 
random price follows a uniform distribution from 1-18 ECU. Moreover, in the WTA scenario 
participants stating low prices might be motivated to earn at least something from selling the prospect 
of the PP. Further, we assume that there is a certain demand effect for those participants who are 
altruistic, i.e. that they felt ‘forced’ to think about the passive partner when being confronted with 
her/his prospects and are not necessarily intrinsically altruistic. 
However, we find that these preferences are not stable across different conditions. First, we find that 
individuals price the prospects higher when they want to sell them than when they want to buy them, 
providing evidence for the existence of an endowment effect (H3). However, the endowment effect 
did not occur when participants were pricing the PP’s prospects. This result is surprising, as altruism is 
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sure losses, whereas in the latter they forego the opportunity to earn more in order to behave 
altruistically. Second, in support of the order effect, we find that the participants stated higher 
reservation prices for their own prospects when they considered them first, than when they stated them 
second. The lower reservation prices in the second scenario are probably due to the learning effect. 
Interestingly, we find a similar order effect when participants are pricing PP’s prospects: the prices are 
higher if they are confronted with the PP’s prospects first. Although this partially may be explained by 
the demand and learning effects, it also provides evidence that participants tend to be more altruistic if 
they are confronted with PP’s prospects before making decisions about their own prospects. 
 
Hypotheses  Results 
H1  Individuals price prospects with a risky payoff lower prospects with a fixed payoff.  Yes 
H2  Individuals refrain from the maximum benefit in support of the prospect of another 
individual. 
No 
H3  Individuals price prospects higher when selling them than when buying them.  Yes 
H4  Individuals price prospects higher when they price them first, compared to a scenario in 
which they price these prospects second. 
Yes 
Table 9.   Overview of hypotheses. 
What concerns the impact of information retrieval on the stated reservation prices, we find significant 
differences between participants who bought a certain type of information vs. those who did not. First, 
we observe that the median of the reservation prices of those who did not buy the information about 
the fixed prospect is equal to 10 ECU, which is exactly the payoff of the prospect during the trial run 
where participants were given that information for free. Although participants were explicitly told that 
the values of the prospects will be different during the phases, they still used this information to state 
their reservation prices. This can be due to an ‘anchoring effect’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) 
which describes a biased estimate toward an arbitrary value before making a numerical estimate 
(Jacowitz and Kahneman, 1995). Decision-making based on such heuristics provides indices of 
bounded rationality in individual behavior.  
Second, exploring the trade-off between the motivations of loss-aversion (by not purchasing 
information) and ambiguity-aversion (to find out the payoffs), we are able to uncover individual 
preferences regard to risk. We find that risk-tolerant participants retrieve either at least the high-payoff 
(and the high probability) or the expected value of the prospect. We assume that risk-tolerant 
participants are ‘satisficed’ (from satisfy and suffice; cf. Simon, 1957) with the information about the 
prospects’ possible gains or with an aggregated value of their expected payoff. Accordingly, we find 
that risk-averse participants either do not purchase any information at all or at least the information 
about the prospects’ low payoff. Therefore, we deduce a positive correlation between risk-aversion 
and loss-aversion, i.e. individuals who are risk-averse also refrain from buying information in order to 
avoid loosing money. As loss-aversion and ambiguity-aversion are opposed concepts, we can also 
deduce a negative correlation between risk-aversion and ambiguity-aversion, i.e. individuals who are 
risk-averse do not mind not knowing all relevant information. Only the fear to loose even more can 
motivate risk-averse participants to invest in acquiring the value of the low payoff. Although we 
cannot determine risk preferences of participants who purchase ‘full information’, it is interesting to 
explore why the participants were not satisfied with the expected value and were ready to invest in 
purchasing more information. One explanation might lie in the Ellsberg Paradox (1961). Thus, our 
participants might accept losses in order to be fully informed about the payoff of their prospect.  
Third, based on the information retrieved about the prospects of the PP, we find that participants who 
purchase any information (or at least one piece of information) about the PP’s prospects are altruistic. 
This result is quite intuitive: the sheer fact that participants are paying for the information about the 
PP’s payoffs makes them altruistic to some extent.  
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‘External validity (of experiments) asks the question of generalizability: To what populations, settings, 
(and) treatment variables (…) can this effect be generalized?’ (Campbell and Stanley, 1966). Our 
results can be generalized to larger populations and to study other related phenomena due to several 
reasons. First, our sample is relatively large, even though it contains mainly students. Second, our 
setting is abstract, i.e. we measure risk preferences and social preferences without a specific context. 
Third, our experimental design includes four treatment variables (WTA vs. WTP, ‘DM first’ vs. ‘PP 
first’), which allows us to measure the robustness of our results. 
Our results can be applied to a wide array of problems that require behavioural rather than attitudinal 
responses. For example, problems in IS behavioural research such as the dichotomy between stated 
privacy attitudes and actual behavior, confirmed in several studies, e.g. Berendt et al. (2005) can be 
well measured in an experiment and explained by the paradigm of bounded rationality. For example, 
Grossklags and Acquisti (2007) pursue the first step in this direction by conducting a full-scale 
experiment in order to deduce real privacy related behaviors of individuals. The authors show a clear 
preference for money over data across a wide variety of scenarios, including differences between 
WTA and WTP when valuing privacy sensitive information, which they explain by various 
psychological distortions. Thus, the knowledge acquired in behavioral economics can be transferred to 
study also IS-related phenomena. 
Moreover, we encourage IS researchers to take aspects of bounded rationality into consideration with 
regard to the experimental design as well as to the interpretation of experimental results. Concerning 
the experimental design, we recommend to include several treatments in order to verify the stability of 
results. Our experiment shows that preferences are generally not stable, and by measuring them only 
in one condition may prove inadequate to infer true attitudinal responses. With regard to the 
interpretation of results, we recommend to take into consideration aspects of bounded rationality: 
psychological distortions, cognitive biases, decision heuristics, etc. In our experiment, we show that 
aspects of bounded rationality influence an individual’s behaviour considerably. To summarize, our 
study confirms the importance of careful design and analysis of the experiments in their attempt to 
excel the validity of the survey instruments widely used in IS. 
6 Conclusion 
This study uncovers aspects of boundedly rational decision-making involving risk preferences and 
social preferences. The revealed preference approach allows us to uncover that individuals are 
generally risk-averse and egoistic. Although these preferences are not stable under different 
conditions: individuals price prospects higher when selling them than when buying them, as well as 
when they price specific prospects first, compared to when they price these prospects second. This 
provides clear indices of bounded rationality in individual decision-making.  
Moreover, our experiment shows that we can use information retrieval behavior to predict risk 
preferences as well as social preferences of individuals. It turns out that for many participants, risk-
aversion is a stronger motivation than ambiguity-aversion, which prevents individuals from acquiring 
information, especially when the amount and complexity of such information increases. This might be 
due to the cognitive overload induced by superfluous information for decision-making. 
References 
Acquisti, A. and Grossklags, J. (2007). When 25 Cents is Enough: Willingness to Pay and Willingness 
to Accept for Personal Information. Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS).  
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 065Acquisti, A. and Grossklags, J. (2004). Privacy Attitudes and Privacy Behaviour: Losses, Gains and 
Hyperbolic Discounting. The Economics of Information Security. 
Andreoni, J. and Miller, J. (2002). Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the 
Consistency of Preferences for Altruism. Econometrica, Econometric Society, (70) 2, 737-753. 
Becker, G.M., DeGroot, M.H. and Marschak, J. (1964). Measuring utility by a single-response 
sequential method. Behavioral Science, (9), 226–232. 
Berendt, B., O. Günther, and Spiekermann, S. (2005). Privacy in E-Commerce:Stated Preferences vs. 
Actual Behavior. Communications of the ACM, (48) 4. 
Camerer, C.F. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton 
University Press. 
Camerer, C. and Weber, M. (1992). Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and 
Ambiguity. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, (5), 325-370. 
Campbell, D.T. and Stanley, J.C. (1966). Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research. 
Skokie, Il: Rand McNally.  
Charness, G. and Rabin, M. (2003). Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests. General 
Economics and Teaching 0303002, EconWPA. 
Davis, F.D. (1989). Perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, and user acceptance of information 
technology. MIS Quarterly, (13) 3, 319–340 
Ellsberg, D. (1961). Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms. Quarterly Journal of Economics, (75) 
4, 643–669. 
Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K.M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, (114), 817–868. 
Fishbein, M. and Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: An introduction to theory 
and research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.  
Gilboa, I. and Schmeidler, D. (1995). Case-based decision theory. The quarterly Journal of economics, 
(110) 3, 605-639. 
Goldstein, D.G. and Gigerenzer, G. (1999). The recognition heuristic: How ignorance makes us smart. 
In G. Gigerenzer and P.M. Todd, (Eds.). Simple heuristics that make us smart. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Güth, W., Levati, M.V. and Ploner, M. (2008). On the social dimension of time and risk preferences: 
An experimental study. Economic Inquiry, (46) 2, 261-272. 
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R. and Schwarze, B. (1982). An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum 
Bargaining. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, (3), 367-388.  
Hevner, A.R., March, S.T., Park, J. and Ram, S. (2004). Design science in information systems 
research. MIS Quarterly, (28), 75-105. 
Huck, S. (2004). Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour – Game Theory Experiments And 
Bounded Rationality. Palgrave McMillan. 
Jacowitz, K.E. and Kahneman, D. (1995). Measures of anchoring in estimation tasks. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, (21), 1161-1166. 
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J.L.and Thaler, R.H. (1990). Experimental tests of the endowment effect and 
the Coase theorem. Journal of Political Economy, (98) 6, 1325–1348 
Perreault, W.D. Jr. 1975. Controlling Order-Effect Bias. The Public Opinion Quarterly , (39) 4, 544-
551  
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics. American Economic 
Review, (83), 1281-1302. 
Rosenthal, R. and Rosnow, R.L. (2009). Artifact in behavioral research. Oxford University Press. 
Samuelson, P. (1983). A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumers' Behaviour. Economica, (5), 61-71. 
Simon, H.A. (1957). Models of man: Social and rational. New York: Wiley  
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 
(185), 1124-1131. 
Weber, E.U., Blais, A.-R. and Betz, N. (2002). A Domain-Specific Risk-attitude scale: measuring risk 
perceptions and risk behaviors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making J. Behav. Dec. Making, 
(15), 263–290. 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 065